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Discussion of T.A. Moultrie and R.G. Thomas's 
''The Right to Underwrite? An Actuarial Perspective 
With a Difference" 
Charles L. Trowbridge* 
This interesting but controversial paper studies a subject I too have 
seriously considered. Nearly a decade ago I was commissioned to pre-
pare a monograph that appeared in 1989 under the auspices of the 
Actuarial Education and Research Fund under the title Fundamental 
Concepts of Actuarial Science. 1 Chapter VII of this work, "Classification, 
Selection, and Antiselection," claims that the cluster of ideas surround-
ing these three words form a fundamental actuarial concept. 
I have recently reviewed this monograph (hereinafter FCAS) and am 
struck by the dissimilarities between the two treatments. The authors 
of "The Right to Underwrite?" (RTU) were unaware of my work, and I 
mean this in no derogatory sense. FCAS does not appear in the usual 
literature search, particularly one undertaken from overseas. 
This discussion will be an outline of the points at which FCAS and 
RTU differ. I will paraphrase, avoiding detail and concentrating on the 
essentials. I highlight the important differences by considering only the 
three questions stated below. 
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Why Do Insurance Companies Underwrite? 
Chapter VII of FCAS states that insurance companies underwrite not 
because of any specific concept of fairness and not because they have a 
right or freedom to do so, but because they must. If insurance prospects 
have choices about whether to buy, in what amount, and from whom, 
they can be expected to act in their perceived self interest and antiselect 
against the collective. Underwriting has no other purpose than self-
protection. (To emphas~ze this point, FCAS notes that the predominant 
forms of life insurance protection, at least in North America, are those 
where such chOices are not given, where antis election is minimal, and 
where und~rwriting disappears). 
RTU, on the other hand, does not mention antiselection. RTU has 
no clear answer to the question, though at one point RTU suggests that 
the purpose of underwriting is the creation of a competitive advantage 
for the insurer. I am troubled by the antiselection omission. Do the 
authors of RTU believe that antis election does not exist or that it can 
be disregarded? 
What Is the Relationship Between Underwriting and the Actu-
arial Profession? 
FCAS treats the cluster of ideas surrounding classification, selec-
tion, and antiselection as one of a handful of fundamental actuarial 
concepts. Sound classification systems have a statistical component, 
but FCAS recognizes that SOCially oriented considerations also can be 
important. While actuaries have no monopoly in the design of clas-
sification systems, they do have expertise. This expertise may lie in 
the ability to examine all aspects of a difficult problem. Classification 
systems in use today are products of actuarial thinking tempered by 
actuarial experience. 
RTU, on the other hand, views the relationship differently. The ac-
tuarial approach is defined only statistically. After defining the term so 
narrowly, however, RTU says that the actuarial approach is incomplete. 
Do Life Company Actuaries Have a Professional Obligation to 
Speak Out When They Disagree With the Company's Classifi-
cation System? 
RTU seems to answer this question with a resounding yes. The au-
thors of RTU clearly and honestly speak and suggest that others should 
do the same. 
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FCAS is silent on this question. If forced, the author of FCAS might 
reply as follows. The views of the insurance industry and of the ac-
tuarial profession on classification are similar. Both realize there are 
no perfect solutions to this difficult matter, and both are searching for 
better answers, especially in areas where statistical and social consid-
erations conflict. If any person, actuary or otherwise, has constructive 
ideas on how classification methods for any financial security system 
can be improved, these ideas should be well received. These ideas, 
however, must recognize the world as it is, not as we wish it were. 
William R. Lane* 
The authors raise a number of issues that are legitimate societal 
concerns today. Several points, however, are worth noting. 
Two Types of Insurance 
The authors rightly determine that the distinction between insur-
ance as a merit good and insurance as a social good is important. But 
they do not differentiate forms of insurance. 
Certain types of insurance are largely all-or-none propositions. A 
person either has or doesn't have medical insurance. While a huge spec-
trum of provisions to medical insurance (such as deductibles, coinsur-
ance, and restrictions applicable to managed care provider networks) 
exists, a central question remains: Does the level of benefits available 
to insureds allow them access to medical care services for all types of 
injuries and illnesses? Under these circumstances, the issue of whether 
insurance is a merit good becomes a critical question. If society deems 
access to medical care services to be a merit good (in other words, avail-
able without regard to ability to pay), then medical insurance also must 
be considered as a merit good. It is important to note that the cost of 
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Mr. Lane is vice chairman of the Health Benefits Research Committee for the Society 
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medical insurance with a $100,000 maximum benefit and the cost of 
medical insurance with a $10 million maximum benefit is not signifi-
cantly different. The preponderance of the cost of medical insurance is 
determined by the benefits that most persons consider to be basic to the 
insurance (such as covering most of the cost of hospital and physician 
services). 
Other types of insurance are incremental. For example, a person 
may have $10,000 of life insurance, or $25,000 of insurance, or $10 
million of life insurance. While it may be argued that a minimum level 
of life insurance is a merit good (at least as long as the individual has 
dependents who rely on the individual for income), it would be difficult 
to argue the same point for $10 million of insurance. In this case the 
cost for $10 million of insurance is essentially 1,000 times the cost 
of a $10,000 policy. Thus, for life insurance, if one is to argue that 
it constitutes a merit good, then one also must determine how much 
coverage is required as a social necessity. 
The two concepts, all-or-none and incremental, are not mutually ex-
clusive. For example, disability income replacement is largely an all-or-
none proposition with regard to the types of disabilities covered, but 
the benefit amount is incremental. Life insurance, if offered, rarely ex-
cludes specific conditions after the contestable period. Thus, the issue 
of what causes of death are covered is usually not significant. Given 
the trend to ever increasing deductibles for medical insurance, it also 
has an element of incremental benefit levels. 
Incremental benefits can be considered a merit good only to the 
extent that the level of benefits is appropriate. Hence, the debate for 
such benefits must begin with a question of what level of benefit is 
under discussion. All-or-none benefits, however, beg the issue of their 
social necessity; the question of whether the coverage constitutes a 
merit good is critical. Hence, any discussion of whether society should 
require insurance products to be available should begin by limiting the 
discussion to those products that are merit goods, and that will require 
for some forms of insurance a discussion of how much coverage is a 
social requirement and how much is a personal decision. 
An Actuarial Issue 
The authors claim that "the choice between alternative views of fair-
ness ... is not an actuarial question." I strongly disagree. Offering 
a good as a merit good requires redistribution of revenue. When the 
good is purchased on a voluntary basis, knowledgeable persons resist 
the purchase to the extent they perceive the price of the good has been 
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increased by such redistribution to the point that the value of the good 
to the individual is no longer worth the cost. All forms of insurance 
require redistribution. That is the chief purpose of insurance. But in-
dividuals, when viewing such a voluntary transaction, make a personal 
determination if the cost of redistribution is worth the value of the 
benefit obtained by the insurance. 
The question then arises: At what point does offering insurance on a 
voluntary basis become financially impossible (in other words, the prod-
uct is incapable of statistically providing a profit that at least equals the 
cost of capital) when legislation or social expectations have required the 
insurer to consider the product as a merit good? 
While the understanding and financial modeling of individual selec-
tion of insurance is not an exact science, it is within the province of 
the actuary. No other profession is as well equipped to understand 
and evaluate these financial mechanics as the actuary. This issue has 
been explored in the context of various insurance coverages within the 
United States. It is professionally challenging, but cannot be considered 
as strictly a question of social philosophy. 
For many years medical insurance in the United States was relatively 
inexpensive and was offered by many Blue Cross and Blue Shield orga-
nizations as essentially a merit good. Individuals and employers were 
largely not underwritten, and prices were rarely, if ever, related to the 
individual risk. As the cost of medical coverage rose, however, the will-
ingness of individuals and employers to finanCially support this redis-
tribution of revenue declined. Providers of medical insurance, includ-
ing Blue Cross and Blue Shield, were faced with the issue of accepting 
prospects for coverage and basing the price of coverage on the expected 
cost of coverage or going out of business due to bankruptcy. 
This change in underwriting culminated in a national debate over 
health care reform. At the crux of that debate was the issue of whether 
medical insurance was a merit good. (Albeit the term was rarely if ever 
used by the popular press.) I participated in this debate in several ways. 
In the United States actuaries vigorously discussed all sides of the ques-
tion. Those actuaries who strongly favored considering medical insur-
ance as a merit good were forced to bring actuaries into the debate 
because a merit good loses it value if it can't be finanCially supported. 
In other words, the actuarial question of how to financially support a 
voluntarily purchased merit good had to be answered; public policy re-
sisted legislation that restricted the insurance providers in their ability 
to underwrite and differentiate in price based on risk. 
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Simply because society wishes for something to be available at a 
given price doesn't make it possible. A law requiring luxury cars to 
be sold for $100 each would not make them more available. It sim-
ply would mean that no luxury cars would be sold to anyone. Though 
insurance is more complex than a luxury car, the result of outlawing un-
derwriting would produce the same result: no insurance, as we know it 
today, would be sold. 
Actuaries have an important role in helping the general public un-
derstand the ramifications that such decisions produce. Actuaries also 
have a critical role in the financial modeling of such restrictions and the 
development of alternate approaches that balance the financial needs 
of the insurers with society's desire to make insurance available to alL 
It has been my experience in this country that many actuaries have con-
tributed to this debate and have reflected all sides of the questions at 
hand. 
Authors' Reply to Discussion 
We thank the discussants for their comments and suggestions. We 
are grateful to Mr. Trowbridge for drawing our attention to his mono-
graph, which contains a broader treatment than is typical in actuarial 
accounts of underwriting. 
Mr. Trowbridge asked if we believed that anti-selection does not ex-
ist. That anti-selection can and does occur in voluntary insurance is 
not in dispute. The extent to which it occurs, and whether its occur-
rence Significantly impairS the viability of private insurance, however, 
are strictly empirical questions for which the answers will differ accord-
ing to the class of insurance, the rating factors concerned, and over 
time. For many classes of insurance, some degree of anti-selection may 
be regarded as socially optimal according to Rawlsian or other public 
choice criteria. More prosaically, the occurrence of some degree of anti-
selection may maximize public acceptance of the insurance mechanism 
(as noted by Mr. Lane in the context of medical insurance). 
In the light of our brief excursions into social philosophy, both dis-
cussants were concerned to reclaim risk classification as a largely if not 
exclusively actuarial matter. According to Mr. Trowbridge, actuaries' 
expertise may lie in their ability to examine all aspects of a difficult 
problem. Actuaries have a statistical and financial training, but they 
typically have little knowledge of social philosophy or ethics and no 
professional interest in, or concern for, persons who are harmed by 
underwriting practice. Even if actuaries might be capable of examining 
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all aspects of the problem, there are other constraints that make them 
reluctant to do so; as Mr. Trowbridge notes, the views of actuaries on 
underwriting are usually conveniently aligned to those of their principal 
employers. 
Finally, we were exhorted to recognize the world as it is, not as we 
wish it were. The world as it is to whom? To actuaries ensconced com-
fortably in the insurance industry, or to those whom actuaries would 
exclude from medical insurance in the name of the principle of actu-
arial fairness? The acceptability of the world as it is depends on from 
where it is viewed. 

